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A POLICY FAILURE ANALYSIS OF SALMON ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMS
Ray Hilborn
Introduction
The Canadian government has established a policy of
enhancing natural salmon runs on the west coast. The
basic concept of enhancement for commercial species is
to provide additional artifical spawning grounds. In
effect this creates new salmon stocks. The Fulton River
spawning channels are the best example currently in
operation; more such developments are being considered.
There are several potential problems with such stock en-
hancement facilities. In this paper I wish to consider
long range problems associated with achieving an optimal
exploitation of both enhanced and natural stocks. I have
discussed this problem earlier (Hilborn, 1974) and used
a deterministic model to find what would happen to a natural
salmon stock being harvested simultaneously with an en-
hanced stock with a higher productivity. Briefly, the
problem is that in order to optimally harvest the combined
stocks, the natural stock (with a lower productivity) would
be kept at lower stock levels, thus subjecting it to
a higher probability of random extinction. This concept is
summarized in figure 1, which shows the equilibrium stock
level of the natural stock when a combination of natural
and enhanced stocks are harvested at maximum sustained
yield. The larger and more productive the enhanced stock
is made, the lower is the equilibrium size of the natural
stock.
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This model was deterministic; in nature there is a
very high variance in productivities. Walters (1975)
has looked at optimal exploitation rates for stochastic
models of a single stock and derived several alternative
policies for maximization of yield or minimization of
variance of yield. My approach was to use the same sto-
chastic dynamic programming optimization technique, but
I applied it to a combination of natural and enhanced
stocks. The optimal policies thus derived were analyzed
by a new technique for·policy failure analysis. The
technique described in detail later consists of taking a
single management policy and asking what happens in the
event of a disaster. The two types of disaster I consider
in this paper are 1) complete failure of the enhanced
stock, and 2) two consecutive generations with very poor
productivity.
Policies Analyzed
I have considered five possible management strategies.
In all cases I assume a single natural stock with a Ricker
equilibrium density of two million and a productivity of
1.3, and an enhanced stock with a Ricker equilibrium density
of 2 million and a productivity of 1.8. The five management
policies considered were:
1) Long term maximized yield using dynamic programming
optimization.
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2) Maximization of the following objective function:
Objective = the harvest + 2 * the natural stock size.
(This objective function should prevent the natural
stock from ever reaching very low levels).
3) A harvest curve (derived by dynamic programming)
designed to minimize the variance of the harvest around
1.9 million fish per year.
4) A constant harvest rate of .594, which is the optimum
long term harvest rate for a deterministic population. See
Hilborn (1974) for equations.
5) A maximum yield policy (from dynamic programming)
for the natural stock, with no enhancement at all.
For all of the policies except 4, stochastic dynamic programming
was used to determine the actual harvest policies. This
is the best method currently available for complex non-
linear dynilluic models. All programs and conceptual develop-
ment were done independently from those of Walters (1975),
and our results were identical for the single stock case
under policies 1, 2, and 5. This gives us greater confidence
than usual with our own programming.
The next section presents the technique of policy failure
analysis used and then applies it to a very simple case, our
five salmon policies. This is primarily an exercise in
methodology. Now that we are satisfied that it works, we
will later apply the methodology to a more realistic salmon
model which keeps track of the age classes, has adults
returning at four and five years, etc.
-4-
Policy Failure Analysis
Policy failure consists of an unexpected occurrence
in the managed system which disrupts maximization of the ob-
jective function. Such failure may be due to natural events
such as poor weather, disasters, etc., or man made changes
or restrictions outside our control as system managers.
For instance, the decision to build a hydro development on an
important salmon stream made by another agency would be a
policy failure to a salmon manager. Some kinds of policy failure
are explicitly taken into account in stochastic dynamic
programming situations. For instance, several years of poor
productivity are a possible stochastic outcome recognized
in the optimization. In general, the kinds of policy fail-
ure we wish to consider will be external to the model and
we will have to artifically cause the failure to happen
in the model. We then see how the system, as represented
by the model, would respond to this form of failure.
In this salmon analysis, the two years of bad produc-
tivity, or weather, are implicitly optimized using stochastic
dynamic programming. We consider this a policy failure only to
explicitly look at the time stream of payoffs if we do get
these two bad years. The total enhancement failure is complete-
ly external to the mode] and is more typical of the types of
policy failure usually comsidered with this type of analysis.
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There are three steps in the analysis of policy failure.
First, we must decide which types of policy failure we wish
to consider; second, we must assess the subjective prob-
ability of each of these failures occurring; and third, we
must find a set of techniques for assessing the consequences
of the failure. The end product of policy failure analysis
should be a table listing for every policy, the possible forms
of policy failure, the probability of failure, and the cost
of failure (table 1).
Defining the objective functions and the types of policy
failure is a task best suited for system managers in concert
with systems analysts. There are no formal rules for this
step in the analysis and I will not consider it further.
Calculating the probabilities of the failures occurring is
also a difficult task. If the policy failure is a natural
event, some form of historical time series analysis may
prove the best technique. If the failure is a man made one,
deciding the probability of failure is a subjective judgment
and is probably best left up to the management agency.
Having ignored the first two steps in policy failure
analysis, we believe we can offer some good techniques for
assessing the cost of policy failure. To measure this cost,
we must first define what the payoffs are so that we know what
we lose by a policy failure. This again touches on the
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question of objective functions, and for salmon we used the
total annual catch as the measure of payoffs. We have a much
more sophisticated method of measuring payoffs for complex
systems such as the budworm, and this method is described
elsewhere. Given our payoffs (total catch), we ask what
happens when a policy failure occurs.
We now must introduce the concept of manager's time
scale (MTS). MTS is a measure of over what period the man-
ager responsible is interested in what happens to the system.
If the system itself is rapidly changing and policy failures
will happen over a short period, for instance a strike in a
municipal sewage treatment plant, then the MTS is very short.
If the system is a much slower one and problems arise slowly
and have long effects, then the MTS will be much longer. An
example of this might be an erosion prevention program, or
forest management, both of which have long time periods as-
sociated with management. The MTS is also a function of
the institutional framework of the management agency. If
the persons responsible for responding to policy failure
change rapidly, then the MTS will tend to be much less than
if the same person tends to be in charge for long periods of
time. Given these considerations, the persons performing the
policy failure analysis must select what they believe the
appropriate MTS, but the policy failure analysis can be done
for several possible MTS's and the results compared. For
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the salmon analysis we have chosen five generations (20-
25 years) as the appropriate time scale.
The purpose of choosing a MTS is that when we ask:
"What happens to our payoffs if this type of policy failure
occurs?", we must have a time scale in which to assess the
consequences of the failure. Our technique is to run the
model for the MTS under each type of policy failure and measure
the payoffs under that failure. This is a bit more compli-
cated than meets the eye. The cost of policy failure greatly
depends on the state of the system when policy failure occurs,
and the state of the system at the time of policy failure.
This in turn depends on the management tactics being used. Our
technique involves running the model for many intervals
(5000 years) under each management option to assess the long
term payoffs over the MTS. This must be repeated many times
so that the state of the system at the point of policy
failure will assume a frequency distribution similar to
the long term frequency distribution. For complex cases like
the budworm, discrete states are defined and the long term
probability of being in that state is multiplied times the
cost of failure if the system was in that state (this whole
procedure for the budworm is described elsewhere).
We can now construct the first table of cost of policy
failure (table 2). For a simple objective function such as
annual catch it is fairly easy to see what happens under
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policy failure from this table. However, there is a further
step in the analysis: We shall attempt to directly measure
the "resilience" of various management tactics. Without go-
ing into an in-depth review of resilience, let me define a
resilient strategy as one whose payoffs are not reduced by a
policy failure. Let us scale everything from zero to one so
that a strategy that loses no payoff by policy failure has
a "resilience" of one and a policy that loses the maximum
amount of payoff has a resilience of zero. Thus resilience is
defined as
1.0 - (payoffs before policy failure - payoffs after
policy failure).
The payoffs must also have been scaled between zero and one.
What I have used as the maximum was the highest payoff found
under any management strategy, which for this study is the
long term payoffs under the maximum yield strategy (A).
Thus we can present, a new payoff table (table 3) with all
payoffs scaled between zero and one, and from this table
calculate a resilience table (table 4). A slight problem with
this analysis is that any strategy which does not have a long
term payoff of 1.0, cannot have a resilience of zero, even
if the stocks are completely wiped out. We might alterna-
tively define the resilience as the proportion payoffs lost
under policy failure. The basic question is whether we are
interested in the absolute magnitude of payoff loss, or the
relative one.
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In more complex ecological systems it is possible to
produce irreversible effects due to some management practices
and policy failures. The only irreversible effect possible
for this salmon model -is the total elimination of a stock,
which does not happen under any of our proposed management
tactics. For systems where irreversible changes do occur, we
want to assess the long term cost of the policy failure as
well as the cost during the MTS. To do this we must run the
model for a very long period after policy failure, again
repeating it many times to approximate the natural distribution
of states at the point of policy failure. This would produce
an additional column at the bottom of each table, listing long
term benefits after a policy failure.
Discussion
Despite the simplifying assumptions used in this model,
we can draw some useful conclusions from the results in
tables 2, 3, and 4. It is clear that policy 1, the long
term yield optimization, produces the highest yield under
all policy failure. This is not surprising, considering the
technique of dynamic programming used: the rules for optimal
yield have been worked out for situations when the enhanced
stock is at low levels, or when there are two consecutive
generations of poor productivity. The second policy,
maintenance of old stocks, does not look particularly good.
The size and productivity of the natural and enhanced stock
used here never brought the natural stock near extinction,
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so the yield after policy failure was not better for
this policy than the maximum yield. The minimized variance
policy looks very good. Although the long term yield is
considerably lower than the maximum yield, there are many
benefits to maintaining a somewhat constant harvest. The
fleet may not have the capacity to harvest at the highest
possible rates and the canneries may not be able to process
the really big runs. Both the fishermen and the canners may
well be willing to sacrifice a little in long term yield
for a much more reliable income. Walters (1975) has discussed
this also. Under the two types of policy failure considered
here, the minimized variance policy is particularly good. It
is very resilient to both these failures (see table 4), and
the actual harvests are not substantially lower than the
maximized yield policy. The fifth management policy was
included mostly for comparison.
The fixed harvest rate policy is clearly inferior to the
dynamic programming optimization of policy 1. This is natural
and really not worth any more discussion. Since there was no
enhanced stock to fail, it has a resilience of 1.0 to
enhancement failure. The resilience to bad weather was high
because the changes were small relative to the value used
as the maximum. If the ratio method of calculating resil-
ience (mentioned earlier) had been used, then the resilience of
the no-enhancement policy would have been comprable to that of
the maximum yield policy for two stocks.
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It is clear that the best policy is either the maximum
yield or minimized variance. The choice is up to the decision
makers. This analysis makes it clear what is sacrificed in
total yield for a more steady income. A distribution of
incomes similar to that presented by Walters (1975) might
prove a useful addition when presenting these options to a
policy maker. We are now examining the possibilities of an
automatic insurance system which would allow the fishermen
to be paid back in bad years for money accumulated in good
years. However, this does not resolve the problem of cannery
capacity. We shall test these conclusions against the more
complex model, but from our current understanding of the
system it is difficult to see how our conclusions will differ.
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Table 2
BENEFITS
(AVERAGE ANNUAL CATCH IN MILLIONS)
MANAGEMENT POLICY
LONG RUN
AVERAGE
5 YEARS
FOLLOWING
ENHANCEMENT
FAILURE
5 YEARS
FOLLOWING2 VERY-BAD-
｜ｾｅａｔｈｅｒ YEARS
A
MAXIMIZE
YIELD
2,50
1.03
1. 77
B
MAINTAIN
OLD STOCK
2,15
,87
1. 56
C
IvlINIMIZE
VARIANCE
1. 82
,99
1.56
D
FIXED
HARVEST
RATE
2,36
,92
1.62
E
NO ENHANCEMENT
ONLY OLD STOCK
1.01
1.03
.71
Table 3
BENEFITS SCALED TO A r1AXU1Uf1 OF 1.0
A B . C D E
1.0 .86 .73 .94 .40 ,,
!
.41 .35 .40 .37 ,41
.71 .62 .62 ,65 ,28
Table 4
RESILIENCE INDICATORS
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!
\
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"
,
l,
..
I.,
1,0 ,86 ,94 ,40
RESILIENCE OF
LONG TERM
BENEFITS
A B C
.73
D E
RES ILI ENCE To
ENHANCEMENT
FAILURE
RESI LI ENCE To
BAD ｾｾｅａｔｈｅｒ
,41 ＬｌｾＹ
.71 .76
,67
,89
,43 1,0
.71 ,88
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